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The self can be understood in objective metaphysical terms as a bundle of properties, as a 
substance, or as some other kind of entity on our metaphysical list of what there is. Such 
an approach explores the metaphysical nature of the self when regarded from a suitably 
impersonal, ontological perspective. It explores the nature and structure of the self in 
objective reality, that is, the nature and structure of the self from without. This is the 
objective self. ii  
I am taking a different approach. In addition to objective reality, which is usually 
understood and explored from an impersonal, quasi-observational and metaphysically 
realist perspective, we can also explore the nature and structure of subjective reality. The 
nature and structure of subjective reality is defined by the nature and structure of first-
personal, conscious experience. Subjective reality is as real as objective reality, and a 
metaphysical realist such as myself can endorse the existence of both kinds of ontology. 
The mental states that, as experienced from the first-personal or subjective perspective, 
capture the nature and structure of subjective reality, are included in objective reality.iii 
The questions to explore in a subjective ontology of the self concern the nature and 
structure of the self from the first-personal or subjective perspective, that is, the nature 
and structure of the self from within. This is the subjective self.iv 
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In this paper, I will explore the ontology of the subjectively enduring self, an 
ontology that is structured by one’s subjective temporal experience and imaginative 
identity with one’s first-personal, conscious perspective in the present, the (near) past, 
and the (near) future. My thesis is that the subjective self endures, at least for short (but 
still relatively substantial and extended) stretches. Implicitly, I will assume that an 
enduring subjective self is consistent with a perduring, four-dimensional objective self. 
(An enduring self persists through time such that the very same, wholly present self exists 
at different times. A perduring self persists through time by being a sum of appropriately 
related but different temporal parts at different times. Subjective endurance is consistent 
with objective perdurance.) 
 
A first-personal perspective on oneself 
Intuitively, the distinction between the subjective perspective of the self and the 
objective perspective on the self mirrors a distinction between perceptual perspectives I 
can have.v An example will help to bring out the point.  
Some contemporary computer games are “first-person shooter” (FPS) games 
where you, the agent, have some sort of task to perform. When you play the game, you 
play as though you were looking out of the eyes of your character. Your line of sight is 
the one the character you are playing has. You are presented as seeming to hold a 
weapon, you “turn your head” to gain a line of sight, etc. In general, you know where you 
are from the first-personal perspective of your character, the character whose “boots” you 
are occupying as you play the game. You are given an artificial simulation of the first-
personal perspective of your character using a visual line of sight, as a first-personal, 
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subjective way for you to know who you are and where you are in the game.vi In this 
way, you are immersed in the game. This game perspective is analogous to the subjective 
perspective. 
However, as you play, you have additional information: a different way in which 
you know which character you are and where you are on the terrain. This information 
comes from an inset in the frame, where you can see yourself “from above”, more or less 
like you can see yourself represented by a moving dot when you locate yourself using a 
map application on your phone. The inset simulates a third-personal visual perspective, 
from above, on your game character, and by watching it you also know who you are and 
where you are. Your information about yourself from this perspective is merely 
observational, in that it comes from positional and other descriptive information that 
anyone could access to in order to locate you in the gameworld. This game perspective is 
analogous to the objective perspective. 
Another way to illustrate the distinction comes from Google Maps. If you use 
Google Maps under the “map view” setting, you’ll see where you are from above, with 
your location represented as a blue dot moving along the map. If you switch to the “street 
view” setting you drop down to street level. Once you are in the street view mode, you 
see where you are by occupying a perspective you’d have by being on the street at that 
location. The view from above, using map view, intuitively corresponds to the (abstract) 
perspective we take when we explore objective ontology. It’s an observer’s view of the 
mapworld with a center (you).  
With this idea in hand, the ontological perspective on the self can be defined as 
the observational perspective. It is analogous to the perspective you take when you are 
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looking at the centered map of reality from above. The subjective perspective from the 
self,, on the other hand, corresponds to the view from within the centered mapworld. That 
can be defined as the agential perspective, which is the perspective we need to explore in 
order to limn the nature of subjective reality. It is an exploration of reality from within, as 
an experiencer, rather than an exploration of reality from without, as a detached observer. 
 
Temporal prospection 
We understand ourselves as persisting selves by understanding ourselves as 
temporally extended entities existing at different points of time (Paul 2014a). Prospective 
assessment using a kind of perspectival reasoning plays a role in reasoning about 
ourselves (as well as about others). 
 
[These] combined observations suggest that the core network that supports 
remembering, prospection, theory of mind and related tasks is not shared by all 
tasks that require complex problem solving or imagination. Rather, the network 
seems to be specialized for, and actively engaged by, mental acts that require the 
projection of oneself into another time, place or perspective … by projecting our 
own mental states into different vantage points, in an analogous manner to how 
one projects oneself into the past and future (Buckner and Carroll 2006: 53).vii 
 
When we mentally project ourselves into the past and future, how do we represent 
ourselves? The question arises because when we understand ourselves to exist at different 
points in time, there are different ways to mentally project the self into the future or the 
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past. Is the mental projection framed from an observational perspective, where I model 
the mind of my future or past self more or less in the same way I’d model the mind of 
another person? Or do I model my past or future self empathetically, that is, from the 
inside or agentially, attempting to occupy my point of view at that time as my point of 
view? We seem to use both types of representation. You can represent yourself in the past 
and in the future from an observational perspective, that is, from an external or more 
impersonal perspective analogous to a perspective that observes your game character 
from above, as an icon on the game map. Or you can represent yourself in the past and in 
the future from an agential or “through the eyes of the agent” perspective, that is, from 
the internal agential perspective analogous to your perspective as a character immersed in 
the game. 
 
The window of the self 
One factor that can influence the nature of how we represent ourselves at different 
times is the temporal distance of my past and future selves from my current self. When I, 
at a time, represent my future self in the distant future, I am more likely to represent 
myself using the observational stance. When I represent a distant past self, I am also 
more likely to represent myself using the observational stance.  
This can be overcome. Sometimes it takes imaginative effort, but sometimes not. 
If I have an experience that triggers an episodic memory, for example, taking a bite of a 
cookie whose taste transports me back to my childhood, I can easily represent my past 
self from my agential perspective, as though I were eating the cookie at my aunt’s knee 
and looking up at her.viii (I can also represent myself observationally in episodic memory, 
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where I seem to observe myself as a child having the cookie at my aunt’s knee, but I 
don’t represent this as looking out from my childlike perspective.) 
We do, however, take the agential perspective very naturally under certain 
circumstances. My representation of myself in my immediate future, as well as in my 
immediate past, is much more likely to be agential. As Pronin and Ross (2006) show, we 
tend to represent ourselves agentially in the immediate past, but even a temporal distance 
of a day can increase the degree of observational representation.ix Similarly, when we 
think of ourselves in our immediate future, we tend to represent ourselves agentially, but 
as we imaginatively increase the temporal distance to a future self, we shift towards an 
observational representation. Your imaginative representation of yourself and what you’ll 
be doing 30 seconds from now is much more likely to represent the world and yourself as 
though you are, metaphorically, looking out from your own eyes. That is, at this temporal 
distance, you can naturally and easily represent yourself from your agential, first-personal 
perspective. Your episodic memory of yourself in your immediate past, say, 30 seconds 
ago, is also much more likely to be a representation of yourself from your agential, first-
personal perspective. 
We can think of the structure of this feature of subjective reality as a window to 
the past and to the future framed from the agential, first-personal perspective. The 
window is typically small. As I’ll explore below, it also requires an implicit assumption 
that there isn’t too much change in the nature of your first-personal experience over its 
temporal extent. Thinking about yourself persisting through time within this temporal 
window involves understanding yourself first-personally at the times within. It’s also 
important that this is a default way to understand yourself as persisting in these nearby, 
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short, temporal stretches. You don’t need to make any special effort to adopt the agential 
perspective here. It’s just a natural way to represent your near temporal selves.  
When we think of our future selves first-personally in this way, we prospectively 
represent the first-personal perspective of our future self at that time. When we think of 
our past selves first-personally, we retrospectively represent the first-personal perspective 
of our past self at that time. This involves thinking about or recalling our past first-
personal agential perspectives as well as reflecting on our future agential point of view. 
In the short term, how I represent myself and my agential perspective stays relatively 
constant as I project myself forward within the agential temporal window. And the way I 
represent being me will also stay largely constant as I retrospectively project myself 
backward and recall my experiences within my agential temporal window.  
 
Temporal Empathy 
Temporally forward projection of one’s first-personal point of view is an 
anticipatory and imaginative act of prospective representation. Temporally backward 
projection of one’s first-personal point of view is a memory-like and imaginative act of 
retrospective representation. 
As I define them, both types of representation are assessments “from the inside”. 
Prospective representation involves taking the agential perspective on one’s future self. 
When you prospectively assess, you grasp your future first-personal perspective at time t 
from your current first-personal perspective. You represent salient features of how you’ll 
actually experience who you’ll be. So, ideally, what you want to represent is the 
subjective, first-personal, experiential character of what it will be like to be you at t.x You 
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want to represent what it will be like to be you “from the inside” at t, that is, you want to 
represent what it will be like to be you then, just as you know what it is like to be you 
now.  
One way to put the point is that you want to project your current first-personal 
perspective, your perspective as it is now, into your future self (but adjusted given any 
relevant changes in circumstances and mental states). If you can project in this way, at 
least along some relevant experiential dimension, you can have the capacity to empathize 
with your future self. The kind of empathy you want is the rich, cognitive sort, not mere 
affective empathy where you simply know how you’ll feel. You want the sort of empathy 
that you can use to generate a cognitively rich representation of your future agential 
perspective. This isn’t merely an affective response to who you’d be. With a cognitive 
type of empathy, you can imagine your future agential perspective in all its cognitive 
richness, as understood through the lens of your current agential perspective, adjusted for 
changes in circumstances.xi 
Above, I described the nature of prospective assessment as anticipatory and 
imaginative. The anticipatory element comes from your anticipation of changes and 
future events. The imaginative element comes from a distinctive feature of prospective 
representation: when we prospectively represent our future selves we imaginatively 
occupy our future agential points of view. This can be described metaphorically, where 
we think of ourselves as “stepping into the shoes” of our future self, by imagining being 
that future self from that future self’s agential standpoint. We imaginatively take on that 
self’s point of view as our own.xii We can take this to be a kind of cognitive empathy for 
a future self, because we take our current agential point of view and attempt to use it to 
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represent our future agential point of view. In this sense, we prospectively empathize 
with our future selves in order to understand them. I understand enough about my future 
self, using my current first-personal conscious perspective, to imaginatively represent 
myself as sharing an agential  point of view with that self. In this sense, I can imagine 
myself as occupying or embodying this future self. One reason this can be valuable is that 
by performing the imaginative simulation I can discover or understand more about my 
future properties. 
My prospective representation thus involves a kind of capture of the first-personal 
or subjective point of view of my future self. Part of the empathetic act involves 
representing the nature and character of my future lived experience as I will experience it. 
That is, I imaginatively experience myself engaging in near future events from my first-
personal agential perspective, where the first-personal perspective I have now is 
qualitatively continuous with the agential perspective I occupy in my imagined future 
experience.xiii  
Retrospective representation also captures my agential perspective. When I 
retrospect, I imaginatively evolve my present first-personal perspective back to my past 
first-personal perspective, adjusting for any changes in circumstance. This imaginative 
act draws on my memory of the nature and character of my past lived experience, that is, 
what it was like to be me then. I cognitively empathize with my past self, representing my 
past self’s first-personal or agential perspective on that situation. In this sense, I “occupy 
the shoes” of my past self. Again, when I retrospect, I imaginatively represent myself as I 
experienced that past event, where my current agential perspective is effectively 
continuous with the agential perspective I took in the past when engaging in that activity. 
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I recall engaging in the event via remembering my experience, and I empathetically 
represent my first-personal agential perspective.   
In each kind of temporally empathetic representation of myself, I represent myself 
from my agential perspective in the near past or near future. My first-personal, agential 
simulation is constant (at least in essentials) and experienced as shared through the past 
and future times within my agential temporal window.   
 
The enduring self 
My representation of the point of view of my future self (and mutatis mutandis of 
my past self) through my agential window gives me a distinctive kind of understanding of 
myself as an enduring self in the near future and near past.xiv How?  
Start by making some simplifying assumptions about objectively persisting 
conscious individuals. Assume that the basic objective ontological structure of such 
individuals is grounded by a series of temporal stages related by appropriate genidentity 
relations. (Genidentity relations are (usually successive) causal or qualitative relations 
between temporal stages of a persisting object.) Objective perdurance comes from 
summing the stages. Objective (qualitative) endurance comes from any partial objective 
qualitative overlap of these stages.xv 
The structure of subjective endurance for an individual, on the other hand, is 
grounded by the nature of her first-personal experience. Take the subjective temporal unit 
of agential experience for a self to be defined by her specious present (Phillips 2010). At 
subjectively near times, I naturally represent my first-personal perspective as a 
continuously enduring agential perspective from the near past, through the specious 
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present, into the near future. The nature and character of my experience is as of being the 
very same enduring self, that is, as of qualitative continuity (with respect to sameness of 
agential perspective), from the inside, through my temporal window.  
 The representation relies on the empathetic ability of my current self to 
(imaginatively) see the world through the eyes of my near past and near future selves, 
where I represent myself as experiencing the qualitatively same agential perspective 
throughout my temporal window. This structures my experience as a subjectively 
enduring point of view, or as a subjectively enduring self.xvi That is, this is the subjective 
ontological foundation for the subjective endurance of the self.xvii An important feature of 
what matters here is that taking the agential perspective, within this window, is the 
default perspective. This is why endurance of my agential perspective seems like such an 
intuitive and natural way to understand persistence. It’s my default mode for the 
continuous experience of my point of view as I persist through short periods of time. 
As time passes, my current self and its temporal endurance window advances.xviii 
As the nature and character of my first-personal perspective gradually evolves, at some 
point I can no longer seamlessly represent past agential perspectives as continuous with 
my own, current agential perspective. Once this happens, it is natural to shift to an 
observer’s perspective on those earlier selves.  
Gradual change in the nature of my near temporal experience is consistent with 
my having the qualitatively same agential perspective throughout a short subjective 
temporal extent. (For example, I retain my first-personal perspective and identify as the 
same subjective self from moment to moment as I move around or experience other 
inessential changes.) However, over time, gradual change can accumulate such that I no 
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longer stand in the same-self relation to a past self. (More radical change can also cause 
this.)The same-objective-self relation in objective reality is intransitive, and can be 
manifested when selves (composed of temporal stages) that compose a person objectively 
change in some significant way over time. The transitivity of the same-subjective-self 
relation in subjective reality fails when I can no longer subjectively represent my past self 
or my future self as the same self I am now. It occurs when the subjective character of the 
agential perspective of that past self or that future self is too qualitatively or 
phenomenally different from my current agential perspective.   
 
Future-blocked 
I have argued elsewhere (Paul 2014b; Paul 2015a) that you can lack the 
imaginative capacity to first-personally represent possibilities for your future self in 
contexts of transformative choice. If you face an experience that will transform you both 
epistemically and personally, defined as a “transformative experience”, before you 
actually have that experience you may not have epistemic access to your future self’s 
agential perspective. You can’t imaginatively model or simulate the way you will first-
personally respond to the experience and the resulting future circumstances. The thesis is 
explicitly Lewisian: an experience of that kind is needed to give the experiencer the 
ability to imagine, recognize, and cognitively model her possible future selves (Lewis 
1990).   
The deep issue with respect to subjective selves is that we need the right sort of 
understanding, in terms of prospective assessment, in order to imaginatively project 
ourselves forward as enduring selves into the future. We also want to retain an 
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understanding of our past selves that allows us to retrospectively assess ourselves as 
enduring through change. My ability to empathetically grasp my other selves in a way 
that represents my agential point of view as enduring is what makes those other selves 
cognitively mine. That is, I intuitively understand, given the shared character of my 
agential perspectives, these past and future selves as me. The kind of psychological 
access I want to my future self and past self, where I can empathetically occupy my first-
personal perspective, is nicely captured by David Velleman: 
 
The future “me” whose existence matters [to me] is picked out precisely by his 
owning a point of view into which I am attempting to project my representations 
of the future, just as a past “me” can be picked out by his having owned the point 
of view from which I have recovered representations of the past (2006: 76). 
 
The problem is that transformative experience can disrupt this first-personal agential 
access to our past, future, and even merely possible selves. 
The central examples are those that scale: an experience that is so dramatically 
epistemically transformative that it carries with it significant first-personal change, 
making it personally transformative. Examples include a case where you could choose to 
become a cyborg by getting a neural chip that will give you an unknown, new sense 
capacity but take away your sense of taste. Another case concerns a congenitally blind 
adult choosing to have a retinal operation to become sighted. Another much-discussed 
example involves a person choosing to have her first child (Paul 2015a, Paul 2015b). The 
idea is that, in such cases, you can’t know what it will be like to have the experience 
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before you have it, and if you choose to have it, it will change the nature of your first-
personal or agential perspective.   
While the claims about transformation are more controversial in some cases than 
in others, the basic idea is this: experience, especially intense experience, can affect a 
person’s representational capacities and her first-personal preferences. Experience can 
transform us in a rich, psychologically representational way. What happens to us can 
affect and control our point of view, because it can affect our preferences and how we 
model and represent the world and ourselves.  On this view, preferences are 
psychologically real mental states that structure an agent’s phenomenology, intentional 
states, and first-personal perspective on the world. An epistemic transformation can 
transform an agent’s abilities and inclinations, and by extension, her preferences and the 
nature of her agential perspective. 
As a result, if we are facing the possibility of significant epistemic transformation, 
we are facing the possibility of significant self-change. If, because we lack the requisite 
experiential knowledge, we cannot prospectively assess the nature of the epistemically 
transformative experience before we undergo it, we cannot prospectively simulate our 
response from our current first-personal perspective to having an experience like this, and 
by extension, cannot prospectively model who we’ll become.xix If you can’t first-
personally model the nature of the experience you’ll have, you can’t first-personally 
assess your response to the experience.xx You can’t model your responses in a way that 
will allow you to “see” your future agential perspectives, the perspectives that could 
result from your experiences.xxi When the experiences are high-stakes, life-defining 
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experiences, the problem extends past merely being unable to assess the immediate future 
outcomes of your choice to being unable to assess who you’ll become.   
To explore this idea a bit more, let’s discuss the case of a congenitally blind adult 
who wants to have retinal surgery in order to be able to see. Imagine that he is a 
saxophone player, and has built his life around his blindness, choosing a career and a way 
of living and understanding the world through touch and sound. His soulful music reflects 
the rich detail that his highly trained auditory capacities give to his lived experience. His 
dominant sense modality is audition, and thus his way of living in the world is deeply 
influenced by his blindness. Like all of us, his lived experience is structured by his way 
of experiencing the world through his senses, especially his dominant sense modality. 
This affects the details of his life and lived experience, from the way he organizes his day 
to the way he navigates his environment and understands the world around him.   
In our example, the saxophonist doesn’t know what it is like to be sighted, and so 
he can’t simulate his possible future (sighted) self after the operation. He thinks he’d be 
happier if he were sighted, but he knows he will change along many dimensions. Since he 
can’t know what it will be like to be sighted, he cannot use imaginative projection to 
determine the nature of his future as a sighted person from his agential perspective. 
The problem for the saxophonist is that there is an epistemic wall created by the 
transformative nature of the experience involved in the choice, one that blocks a role for 
his first-personal perspective in evaluating and assessing his future self from the agential 
perspective. Experience of a certain sort is required for him to be able to imagine his 
future point of view.  
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It’s of course possible for him to be informed, via testimony and description, of 
the value (or utility) for him of possible ways he’ll experience the future. The trouble is 
that this will not help him to imagine the nature of his future lived experience from the 
agential perspective.  
We can see this if we think of the kind of experiential content he must be able to 
represent in order to prospectively represent his future agential point of view. As I argued 
above, for a person to imaginatively represent himself as enduring into the future, he 
must be able to prospectively assess his future point of view. Here, knowing the relevant 
testimony about his future lived experiences isn’t enough for him to be able to imagine 
his future agential perspective. To grasp the subjective, first-personal perspective of his 
future (sighted) self, he needs to have the experience of being sighted. 
What it’s like to be the saxophonist (before the operation) defines his first-
personal subjective self, and what it will be like to be him will define his future subjective 
self. The blind saxophonist’s inability to simulate his future lived experience as a sighted 
individual arises from the fact that he cannot accurately determine, via simulation or 
imaginative representation, what it will be like for him to see. For this reason, he cannot 
accurately determine, via simulation, how he’d respond to the experience of seeing. As a 
result, before the operation, he cannot accurately imagine the nature of his future lived 
experience from his agential perspective.  
One problem he faces arises from the epistemic transformation that gaining visual 
information would involve. The second problem the saxophonist faces is that the 
dramatic nature of the new experience, becoming sighted, scales up into a change in self-
defining experience. Once he becomes sighted, he will no longer have hearing as his 
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dominant sense modality. Once he stops relying on auditory cues the way he did before 
having visual information inform his experiences, his knowledge of the world and his 
relation to it will change in dramatic ways. This suggests that the nature and character of 
his agential perspective will also change. If so, he cannot project himself forward as an 
enduring self through the change.xxii 
Because of the massive epistemic change in his future, the blind saxophonist, 
before the operation, lacks the ability to mentally look forward and prospectively imagine 
his future, sighted agential perspective.  The source of his epistemic failure is the 
transformative nature of the experience: changing his dominant sense modality also 
changes his psychological capacities and states.xxiii Before he becomes sighted, 
empathetic identification of his current agential perspective with the first-personal 
perspective of his future, sighted, self is impossible, because he lacks the abilities and 
information he needs to be able to perform the empathetic task. Without the ability to 
empathetically model his future self along the dimension that is central to the self-change 
involved, the blind saxophonist cannot prospectively assess his future lived experience as 
a sighted person. In this sense, he cannot project himself into the future. In the most 
personal sense possible, he cannot prefigure his future self. 
We can all find ourselves in the position like that of the saxophonist. If you face a 
transformative experience, it is as if you face a blank concrete wall. You can’t see what 
lies beyond. Perhaps you know that whatever happens in the future, past the wall, will 
involve you somehow. You know you’ll be there, in that future moment, living that 
future experience. But you don’t know what it will be like to be that self. Your enduring 
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ii For example, (Benovsky 2009). 
iii We might model the subjective-objective distinction on Brian Loar’s distinction between the phenomenal 
mode of presentation and the scientific mode of presentation (Loar 1990). 
iv We can think of the subjective self as an entity that is subjectively real and numerically distinct from the 
objective self that is objectively real, or we can think in terms of a subjective ontological perspective on the 
self (the self from the inside) and the same self as explored from an objective ontological perspective (the 
self from the outside). I’m inclined to think of the self in terms of the latter conception but I won’t 
distinguish between these two conceptions here. 
v The locus classicus for discussion of this issue in the philosophy of mind is Nagel’s View From Nowhere 
(Nagel 1986). But Nagel’s point concerns physicalism, which is not at issue here. Subjective reality does 
not concern primitive mental states: from the objective ontological perspective, the mental states that 
represent an individual’s subjective reality are fully realized by more fundamental physical states. 
vi Which, of course, you grasp from your own first-personal perspective. 
vii I am not inclined to interpret prospective and retrospective simulation or imagination in an overly strong 
way. For discussion, see (Saxe 2005; De Brigard et al 2015). 
viii This is, of course, the famous Proustian moment with the madeleine, now immortalized in American 
culture by Starbucks and various other companies. For classic treatments of episodic memory and self-
projection, see (Tulving 1972; Tulving 1983). 
ix See especially (Pronin and Ross 2006: 203 Study 4 and Figure 4). Also see (Makati et al 2016). 
x There is a clear parallel to the discovery that Mary makes when she leaves her black and white room and 
discovers what seeing red is like (Jackson 1982). 
xi There’s a bit of hedging I’m doing here. The core features of my first personal perspective have to remain 
enough the same over the temporal window for my agential perspective at each time to count, in terms of 
my experience, as being the same (or representing the same) agential perspective. Inessential changes are 
OK. But which features are core? How much change is too much change? It’s not clear. In any case, when 
we believe we are prospecting accurately, so we believe we are actually imagining what it will be like to be 
our future self, we are preserving the relevant core features in the imaginative act. There’s more to say here 
(see Paul 2002 for related discussion) but it’s for another paper. 
xii I will use the term “imagine” in a broad sense that is consistent with the way many contemporary 
psychologists would use the term. So while visual imagination is covered by my use of the term, I am 
taking “imagining” to be an act that involves cognitive modeling of possible situations, which would 
include modeling without explicit visual imagery. Imagination may or may not involve sensory imagery, 
and any simulation involved is likely to occur only with the level of detail needed to make the intended 
projective assessment (Saxe 2005). 
xiii Of course, “perspective” and “point of view” need not be understood visually. The projection of my 
current perspective into my future perspective does not need to involve the representation of sensory 
images, although it might. And the projection does not have to be at a particularly fine level of detail. 
xiv This is a kind of understanding that I value and use to structure my life and to interpret my lived 
experience over time. See (Paul forthcoming). 
xv For my preferred account of objective endurance and perdurance, see (Paul 2002: 585-9), where I 
develop and defend the notion of partial qualitative overlap for persisting objects. 
xvi Also see Phillips 2014, Dainton 2000, Watzl 2013. 
xvii This kind of representation extends to my merely possible selves at near possible worlds. From my 
agential perspective I imaginatively represent the perspectives and lived experiences of transworld identical 
merely possible selves, that is, I simulate who I could become or who I might have been under different 
circumstances in a non-counterpart theoretical way.   
xviii  The agential perspective is not confined to this temporal window. We can use empathetic memory and 
anticipation to retrospectively leap to a more distant past or prospectively leap to a more distant future. The 
window just defines the temporal extent of our ordinary, effortlessly agential subjective perspective. 
xix For some representative research on how the inability to model one’s future self can lead to poor 
decisions, see (Mitchell et al 2011). 
xx Also see (Carr 2015). 
xxi As I noted above, the more remote your future or past self is from who you are now, the more likely you 
are to model your self from the third-personal, or “detached” perspective. Normally, this remoteness is 
temporal: you are more likely to think of yourself in the third-person when you think of yourself in the 
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distant future or in the distant past, as opposed to the immediate past or future (or the present). But 
temporal distance is only contingently related to the possibility of the first-personal inaccessibility of our 
selves. Instances of episodic memory (think of Proust’s example of the madeleine, which transports him 
into his first-personal perspective as a child) or holding fixed key internal representational features can help 
us to imaginatively occupy the first-personal perspectives of temporally distant selves. And dramatic 
change, even over the short term, can make a temporally immanent self seem remote. (The same distinction 
can hold with respect to modality, that is, with respect to possible selves.) The inaccessibility of one’s 
future first-personal perspective across large temporal or modal distances is part of what can make those 
decisions hard (at least if one wants to choose prospectively, rather than just “picking” or effectively 
flipping a coin. 
xxii See (Hoerl and McCormack 2016) for a very interesting discussion of episodic memory, mental time-
travel, and the anticipation of regret in the context of transformative experience and transformative 
decision-making.  
xxiii In (Paul 2014), I argue that this creates a problem for a model of rational choice based on maximizing 
one’s expected utility when making life-changing choices. An agent facing transformative change cannot 
model the preferences and utilities of her epistemically inaccessible possible future selves. Thus, she cannot 
represent expected utilities for the acts that would bring about these selves, and so she cannot represent the 
possibilities in a way that will allow her to make a rational choice between outcomes involving significant 
self-change. 
xxiv Thanks to Ross Cameron, Trenton merricks, and Ian Phillips for comments and discussion. 
